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Preface
This report was prepared as part of a research project in the framework
of the European Communities' (EC) Action for Cooperation in the Field of
Economics (ACE). It represents the joint effort of researchers from
several countries participating in a research network consisting of the
Centre for European Studies, Sofia, Bulgaria, the University of Aber-
deen, Aberdeen, United Kingdom, the Netherlands Economic Institute,
Rotterdam, Netherlands, and the Kiel Institute of World Economics, Kiel,
Germany (project coordinator). The heading of the ACE project was
"Structural Change in the Bulgarian Energy Sector. Energy and Environ-
mental Policy Options for Bulgaria and Opportunities for Cooperation
with the EC." The following economists belonged to the team: Dr. Lud-
milla Dudova, Dr. Ingrid Shikova, Dr. Marguerita Shivergeva, Dr. Georgi
Tzekin (Sofia), Prof. Alexander Kemp (Aberdeen), Dr. Jan Hoogland (Rot-
terdam), and Dr. Federico Foders (Kiel).
The aim of the report is to analyse the Bulgarian energy sector and to
derive sound policy options for a thorough energy reform in this coun-
try. In doing so, the study contributes to the policy-oriented economic
analysis of the ongoing process of transformation of the Bulgarian eco-
nomy and the role of this country in the international division of la-
bour in the post-CMEA era.
This report would not have been possible without the strong support of
Bulgarian government officials involved in the energy sector, who parti-
cipated in many discussions and gave the research team access to hither-
to unpublished data and other relevant information. Thanks are due par-
ticularly to the Committee of Energy. We are also indebted to the Com-
mittee of Geology and Mineral Resources, the Agency for Privatisation,
the National Electricity Company, and Energoproekt.
Kiel, April 1993IV
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Executive Summary
Bulgaria is a small, lower-middle-income country of Eastern Europe
undergoing economic transition from central planning to a market eco-
nomy. On both the macro and the microeconomic levels the country cur-
rently faces significant disequilibria. The energy sector is among the
sectors of the Bulgarian economy which were worst hit by these develop-
ments. Bulgaria is scarcely endowed with energy resources and tradi-
tionally resorts to foreign trade in order to satisfy a major share of
her demand for energy. As a member country of the former CMEA, the coun-
try pursued an energy-intensive strategy of industrialisation during the
period 1946 - 1989 and became highly dependent on energy imports from
mainly one source, the former USSR. The recent collapse of the CMEA and
the rearrangement of the economic relations of the former USSR disrupted
Bulgarian imports of primary energy, thereby creating serious shortages
of fuels in the country.
Bulgaria makes use of a rather diversified basket of primary and final
energy. The domestic conversion of primary into final energy is severely
hampered by operational problems arising from both the use of deficient
and obsolete equipment and shortages of fuel. Although nominal installed
capacity for the production of electricity exceeds demand by far, power
plants are unable to maintain high utilisation rates and to meet peak
demand. In contrast to the supply side, the demand side of the energy
market is biased towards oil products, which account for almost half of
total energy consumption. Major consumers of energy are industry (parti-
cularly chemicals and iron and steel) and households. Furthermore, the
low level of energy efficiency, the fuel mix and the high level of ener-
gy consumption have an adverse impact on the environment.
The current status of the energy sector can be associated with a policy
that over a period of several decades favoured cheap energy and totally
neglected investment in safety and environmental protection. Subsidised
energy encouraged energy use and lead to the emergence of an economic
structure dominated by energy-intensive technologies. In addition, ener-
gy prices that did not reflect actual supply costs (domestic or inter-VIII
national) contributed to the accumulation of debt by the energy com-
panies. Since the structure of consumer prices for energy favoured
households, instead of big users, the former enjoyed the major benefits
from energy policy.
Although one would have expected a highly centralised organisation of
the energy sector for systemic reasons, Bulgaria's public institutions
and companies involved in the sector are rather decentralised. There is
neither an energy ministry nor any other ministry with the power to de-
sign, implement and monitor energy policy; rather, the responsibility
for energy matters is widely scattered. This is probably the reason for
the current lack of a coherent energy policy in Bulgaria. The instru-
ments of energy policy, including regulated prices, taxes and tariffs,
are not employed to achieve energy or environmental policy goals. Also,
a consistent policy for the participation of foreign companies in the
energy sector is not in sight. Moreover, existing plans to privatise
government-owned companies do not yet extend to the energy sector. The
same applies to the new legal-institutional framework which does not in-
clude laws governing production, transmission and consumption of energy.
Actions recommended in this report include (i) the design of a con-
sistent energy strategy for Bulgaria, (ii) the centralisation of res-
ponsibility for energy policy, (iii) the creation of a comprehensive
legal-institutional framework, and (iv) the privatisation of the energy
sector. Energy policy should liberalise prices, tax consumption and pol-
lution, and create incentives for a close cooperation with EC member
countries. Given the close relationship between energy reform and the
transformation process, to be effective, energy policy instruments call
for an economic setting virtually free of major micro and macroeconomic
disequilibria.I. Introduction
The governments of Central and Eastern Europe embarking on a transfor-
mation of their centrally-planned economies into market economies have
already in an early stage been aware of the close interdependence bet-
ween energy sector reforms and the general transformation process. Cen-
tralised decision-making on energy supply and allocation had been the
cornerstone of central planning: abundant and cheap energy had been as-
sumed to be the most important ingredient of economic growth after capi-
tal. Government investment in the energy sector had been given top pri-
ority. This growth policy resulted in an economy with both high energy
and high capital intensities. With such a legacy of the past, energy
sector reform can be said to constitute a necessary condition in the
transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy.
Decades of cheap energy have lead to a series of domestic and regional
distortions. Besides an energy-intensive industrial structure, domestic
distortions include a lack of investment in energy-saving technologies,
in the development of alternative (depletable and non-depletable) fuels,
and in environmental protection (including nuclear safety). On a re-
gional level, the dependency of the former CMEA member countries regard-
ing energy imports from mainly one source, the former USSR, developed
into a serious threat for sustained energy-intensive economic growth in
those countries. The mounting gap between regional energy supply and
consumption contributed to the exhaustion of this resource-wasting model
of growth in the 1980s; the systemic limits to the supply of conven-
tional fuels could not be effectively compensated for by turning to the
nuclear option. Since the CMEA member countries exchanged an important
part of their national product for energy (and other) imports from the
former USSR, the scope for a regional diversification of energy imports
- which would have called for a diversification of exports towards hard
currency regions - was generally very small.
With the CMEA dissolved at the turn of the decade, the burden of adjust-
ment in the energy sector had to be borne since then not by the Russian
Federation and some other energy-rich CIS member states, but primarilyby the energy-poor, former CMEA member countries. Not surprisingly,
energy sector reform has been put high on the economic policy agenda for
the 1990s in the energy-importing countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. However, since the degree of distortion, the fuel mix, the eco-
nomic structure and the status of the transformation process differ sub-
stantially across countries, the exact design and sequencing of the
policy and instruments needed in the framework of a thorough energy re-
form should be tailored to the very specific conditions prevailing in
each country. This study sets out to analyse the Bulgarian case, in an
attempt to derive sound policy proposals for a country severely hit by
the rearrangement of regional energy trade by the former USSR.
A word on the quality and availability of Bulgarian economic statistics
should be in order here. While official Bulgarian statistics for the
1970s and 1980s are generally unreliable, recent statistics are, in
part, not available, following the reorganisation of the Central Statis-
tical Office. In this study we therefore draw heavily on such sources as
unpublished reports prepared by the World Bank, PlanEcon's Reports on
Developments in the Economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
and the US Central Intelligence Agency's Handbook of Economic Statis-
tics, as far as general statistics are concerned. In those cases in
which estimates from alternative sources differ we offer our own esti-
mates. In contrast to general economic statistics, energy sector statis-
tics from Bulgarian sources, in particular from the Bulgarian Committee
of Energy, seem to reflect actual developments in the energy field; re-
maining gaps were filled in this report resorting to PlanEcon's Quarter-
ly Energy Report, a recent unpublished sector study by the World Bank
and other published material.
II. Economic Background and Outlook
1. Growth Performance
According to standard economic indicators, Bulgaria is currently ex-
periencing a deep recession. Industrial production in the first fourmonths of 1992 fell by about 20 per cent compared to the same period of
1991 and by about 55 per cent as compared to 1990. On average, consumer
prices increased by some 5 per cent per month during the period April
1991 - April 1992; at the end of April 1992, almost half a million per-
sons were unemployed (12 per cent of the labour force) (PlanEcon Report
1992). Due to recession-cum-inflation, Bulgaria's per capita income is
expected to face a dramatic drop in 1992. Following the World Bank's
classification, Bulgaria belongs to the group of countries with a lower-
middle income, specifically to the subgroup with a per capita income
estimate for 1990 in the range of US $ 2060 (Algeria) and US $ 2370 (Ar-
gentina); the estimate for Bulgaria is US $ 2250, which is higher than
Poland's (US $ 1690) and Romania's (US $ 1640) and amounts to no more
than 10 per cent of the per capita income of the US at current exchange
rates (World Bank 1992 b).
The deterioration of Bulgaria's economic performance is not a recent
phenomenon. During the 44 years of communist rule (1946 - 1989) this
formerly agricultural country showed a fast pace of industrialisation
and, at first, achieved average rates of annual growth of real GDP of
almost 6 per cent per year in the 1950s and 1960s. Thereafter, however,
growth slowed down to half this rate in the 1970s and to less than 1 per
cent per year in the 1980s (Table 1). Thus, the current recession cannot
be blamed on either the domestic transformation process or the disinte-
gration of the CMEA alone. Since economic growth was driven primarily by
an expansion of industry, particularly of heavy industry, plausible
hypotheses explaining Bulgaria's adverse development after 1970 are that
import substitution in Bulgaria had already reached its limits in the
late 1960s, and that neither the existing division of labour within the
CMEA nor the rate and quality of technical progress achieved in the USSR
(the region's technological leader) offered new possibilities for indus-
trial growth in Bulgaria. As a small, resource-poor country with a popu-
lation of 8.8 million, exports constituted a necessary outlet for Bul-
garia's industry. Continued export expansion was constrained on the one
hand by a diminished absorption capacity of CMEA member countries for
Bulgarian exports, due to the fact that this country had begun to run an
increasing trade surplus with CMEA member countries in the 1980s. On theTable 1 - Real Gross Domestic Product Growth in Central and Eastern



















































Source: 1961-80: Central Intelligence Agency [1990]; - 1981-91 (excl.
Bulgaria 1990/91): PlanEcon Report [1991, 1992); - Bulgaria
1990, 1991: World Bank [1992a].
other hand, an increasing deficit with Western countries indicated that
Bulgarian products were loosing competitiveness in the West. All in all,
external limits to a further expansion of domestic industrial production
along traditional lines seem to have contributed to the slowdown in eco-
nomic growth. For systemic reasons, this development could not have been
halted and reversed by policies encouraging domestic structural change
and pointing towards a way out from the Soviet technology trap. The dis-
integration of the CMEA only worsened the situation.
A glance at the growth performance of Central and Eastern European coun-
tries (Table 1) reveals that in recent decades Bulgaria not only ex-
perienced rates which were much lower than her own historical record,
but also lower than the rates achieved by other countries in the region.'
Having lead regional economic growth in the 1960s, Bulgaria suffered the
severest slowdown thereafter as well as a contraction of real GDP in
1990 and 1991 that has hitherto gone unmatched in the region.
2. The Structure of the Bulgarian Economy
Before World War II, agriculture was Bulgaria's main economic activity,providing almost 65 per cent of total output. The country's comparative
advantage was founded on its continental climate and fertile soil. In-
dustry provided only 15 per cent of total output. As can be seen from
Table 2, the importance of both sectors almost reversed between 1939 and
• 1990. Interestingly, agriculture reached its lowest share in 1989 and
! started to recover again immediately after the transformation process
was initiated. The share of industry increased continuously until 1987
and declined thereafter. Thus, Bulgaria's economic structure resembles
• quite well the pattern observed in other former CMEA member countries,
in which a disproportionately big industrial sector dominates the eco-
nomy. Compared to other lower-middle-income countries, as Algeria, Ma-
laysia and Argentina, which, as Bulgaria, pursued an industrialisation
strategy based on a forced reallocation of production factors away from
agriculture towards industry, Bulgaria's industrial sector also seems to
be oversized. On the other hand, Bulgaria's services sector appears to
be much smaller than the one typical for a lower-middle-income market
economy.
































































































Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (b) [1991]; - Economist Intelligence
Unit (a) [1992]; - own estimates.Bulgaria's industry structure is heavily biased towards basic, material-
intensive industries, as chemicals and petrochemicals, metallurgy, ma-
chine building and electrical engineering (Table Al), another systemic
heritage. This notwithstanding, food processing still contributes about
a quarter of total industrial output - much more than in any other for-
mer CMEA member country. In this respect, Bulgaria's economy is very
similar to other lower-middle-income countries. Another systemic feature
influencing the structure of manufacturing is the relatively unimportant
production of durable consumer goods and of capital goods for the pro-
duction of durable consumer goods in this country.
Imbalances in the economic structure can also be observed in the geo-
graphical pattern of production. Industrial plants are generally concen-
trated in urban areas, where the centralised administration of economic
activity took place. Migration from the countryside to the cities in the
;
wake of the already mentioned discrimination against agriculture was a
necessary component of Bulgaria's model of industrial development. Ex-
cessive geographic concentration of material-intensive production lead
to negative externalities in terms of environmental damage and a waste-
ful use of the country's very limited water resources.
3. The Pattern of Foreign Trade
Foreign trade plays a key role in the Bulgarian economy. Current esti-
mates put exports plus imports as a share of Bulgaria's GDP somewhere
between 42 and 97 per cent in 1990/1991 (Table 3), with the lower figure
already implying a relatively high degree of openness. Other lower-
middle-income countries as, for example, Algeria and Argentina present
shares of 50 and 22 per cent, respectively (World Bank 1992b). Although
data from different sources differ, the general impression is that total
Bulgarian trade and particularly ruble-denominated transactions dropped
sharply in 1991 (Table 3), as a consequence of the disintegration of the
CMEA. However, the reduction in trade value seems to be related not only
to a decrease in the physical volume of trade, but also to such factors
as (i) the valuation of ruble trade in US dollars, (ii) the depreciation
of the Bulgarian currency vis-a-vis the US $ between January 1990 (levaTable 3 - Bulgarian Foreign Trade by Currency Areas 1990, 1991 (Esti-
mates)
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Source: Trade statistics: PlanEcon Report [1992]; GDP estimate for 1990:
World Bank [1992a]; own estimates and calculations.
2.02/US $) and December 1991 (leva 17.51/US $), and (iii) the develop-
ment of cross rates (leva-ruble-dollar) during this period. Also, price
changes for tradables in the ruble area should have had an impact. Al-
though at this stage it is neither possible to clearly identify the
nature of all the relevant factors nor to determine the actual weight of
individual factors, their combined effect on Bulgarian foreign trade can
be readily seen from Table 3: as measured by balance of payments statis-
tics, exports fell by 48 per cent and imports by 62 per cent; customs
statistics indicate still higher decreases.In contrast to total and to intra-CMEA trade, Bulgarian exports to and
imports from the West decreased by only 9 and 25 per cent, respectively
(payments statistics), a development which almost doubled the share of
trade (exports plus imports) with the West in total Bulgarian foreign
trade. Nevertheless, the former CMEA member countries remained Bul-
garia's largest destination and origin of Bulgarian trade flows in 1991,
with the former Soviet Union remaining the largest single trade partner
(Table A 2). While the relative shares of both exports to and imports
from EFTA member countries and the US also increased, the share of trade
with EC member countries increased most, particularly the shares of
trade with Italy, Greece and the United Kingdom; Germany still was Bul-
garia's single largest partner in the EC. The relative share of trade
with LDCs also benefited from the breakdown of intra-CMEA trade.
The shifts in the regional structure of Bulgarian's foreign trade that
ocurred in 1990/1991 were related to shifts in the commodity structure
of this country's foreign trade. Machinery and equipment, once the domi-
nating product group in both total exports and imports, were displaced
by resource-based product groups as chemicals and fertilizers, food raw
materials, processed foodstuffs, and industrial consumer goods (Table A
3). Fuels, minerals and metals, formerly (1990) amounting to "only"
about 34 per cent of total imports, accounted for about 59 per cent of
total imports in 1991, due largely to the valuation of fuels at inter-
national prices.
Recent developments in the direction and composition of Bulgarian for-
eign trade were accompanied by a radical change in trade policy. Whilst
in the past this country relied on state trading through a few govern-
ment-owned trade firms and substantial quantitative restrictions, most
trade barriers were abolished in February 1991. Import licences are now
granted automatically virtually for all goods (except weapons and a few
other defence-related goods) and export restrictions are retained only
for a small number of items. Export taxes and import duties have been
eliminated. Trade rights have been extended to all firms, private and
Cotton products, carpets, overcoats, men's suits, woman's dresses,
leather shoes, medicines.non-private, and all importers enjoy unlimited access to foreign ex-
change in the wake of the introduction of current account convertibility
of the domestic currency. Exporters are required to repatriate their
proceedings within a month; they are allowed to keep foreign currency-
denominated accounts in Bulgaria.
Even if the relative share of Bulgarian trade with the OECD member coun-
tries and LDCs seems to have benefited from the collapse of the CMEA, it
should be noted that Bulgaria has been running a mounting deficit in its
convertible-currency current account and that therefore genuine trade
creation and expansion with the West will be limited by Bulgaria's abi-
lity to cope with the payments problems associated with this country's
foreign debt. Private capital inflows are still negligible and foreign
exchange earnings continued to drop in spite of substantial hard-curren-
cy income from tourism in the wake of the Yugoslav crisis. At the end of
1991, Bulgaria had accumulated a total debt of US $ 11375 Million,
around 79 per cent of GDP (estimated at US $ 14573 Million) and 304 per
cent of the country's convertible-currency exports as shown in Table 3.
Compared to the external debt picture presented in 1990 (Table A 4), the
debt burden increased dramatically in 1991, bringing Bulgaria on a par
with Hungary, Poland and Argentina in this respect. The size of the debt
is related to the fact that Bulgaria financed her growing deficit in the
convertible-currency current account in the 1980s (especially since the
mid-1980s) primarily with credits with short maturities from Western
commercial banks and now has to face an extraordinary debt service bur-
den. Although the Bulgarian government suspended debt service in March
1990, ongoing negotiations with the London Club of commercial bank cre-
ditors could help to restore Bulgaria's access to the international ca-
pital markets soon. In September 1992 Bulgaria resumed interest pay-
ments and some weeks later the Parliament ratified the debt rescheduling
agreements negotiated with six of the 14 Paris Club creditor govern-
ments.
Issues discussed in London include (i) a partial write-off of debt,
(ii) permission for Bulgaria to buy back her debt in the secondary
market, and (iii) a debt-equity swap programme [PlanEcon Business
Report, 14 October 1992].10
4. Economic Policy
Bulgaria experienced her "Big Bang" in early 1991, when prices for all
goods excluding basic food products and energy were liberalised. Energy
prices were raised twice during 1991, albeit without entirely closing
the gap between domestic prices on the one hand and domestic production
costs and world market prices on the other. The prices for coal, dis-
trict heating and electricity for households, however, remain heavily
subsidised. The prices for seven out of the 14 goods classified as es-
sential and formerly administered by the government were liberalised in-
May 1992. The big bang brought about a shift in the consumer price index
as well as real wage losses during the first three months (Table 4). Al-
though the central bank largely accomodated the price increase by ex-;
panding the money supply in February, the money supply contracted in'
March. With the real rate of interest being negative, the supply of mo-
ney (as measured by Ml) continued to expand in the following months in a
climate of general recession. The immediate effects were an improvement'
of the real wage - in spite of further price increases of controlled
products - and higher government spending, with the latter paving the
way for higher rates of inflation. The system of multiple exchange rates :
was substituted by a unified rate, floating vis-a-vis all other curren- '.
cies, and partial internal convertibility. Given that the real exchange
rate appreciated almost every month from March 1991 to May 1992, contrir
buting to an overvaluation of the domestic currency (Table 4), the
floating can be assumed to have been of the managed type, aiming at
keeping the import bill and foreign debt service payments in domestic
currency as low as possible. A reduction of the budget deficit (1990:
9.2 per cent of GDP) was originally planned for the end of 1991. Un-
fortunately, due to the serious decline in economic activity experienced
in 1990/1991 fiscal revenues were much lower than expected, so that the ,
deficit remained at some 7 per cent, albeit improving somewhat towards
the end of the year (World Bank 1992a); interest payments accounted for
about a third of government expenditure in 1991. ,
The OECD estimates a budget deficit of 12.7 and 14.8 per cent of GDP
for 1990 and 1991, respectively [OECD 1992, p. 16].11

























































































































































































































wage deflated with the CPI (January
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Source: Own calculations with data from PlanEcon Report [May 1992].
The-government progressed in transforming the Bulgarian economy into a
market economy. As part of a financial reform, it created the institu-
tional requirements for a two-tiered banking system and legally sepa-
rated the central bank from the government. Restitution and privatisa-
tion legislation has been finally adopted - Bulgaria is the last of
Eastern European countries to privatise -, and the government has al-
ready set up an agency similar to the German "Treuhand" to administer12
privatisation projects. In many aspects, the privatisation law resembles
the ones passed in Hungary and Poland, which is to say that the voucher
or mass privatisation option has definitively been rejected. The new
constitution endorses private property and the new company law offers a
wide array of organisational possibilities for private economic activi-
ties. Other important laws (taxation, securities, bankrupcy, intellectu-
al property, etc.) are currently being prepared. However, until now,
about 90 per cent of the economy is still run by the state, although the
World Bank reports that more than 170000 new firms were registered in
1991 and that the government is rapidly removing most of the remaining
formal constraints on the establishment of new private firms [World Bank
1992a].
Small scale privatisation began in 1991 and affected some 70 shops and
petrol stations. Also, restitution of agricultural land was launched
during this year. 1992 saw a new drive in privatisation and restitution
in urban areas with a new general law and amendments to older laws being
passed. The new law governs not only small but also large scale privati-
sation, concerning the auctioning of enterprises with a book value of 10
to 200 Million leva (about US $ 0.5 to 10 Million) by the privatisation
agency. All enterprises have to be valued first by chartered account-
ants; employees may buy up to 20 per cent of non-voting shares at a dis-
count. The agency is responsible for the privatisation of 8000 major
firms, while small and middle-sized firms are being privatised directly
by the ministries. The Ministry of Industry intends to offer between 80
and 100 enterprises for sale, which have been grouped in three classes
according to their readiness for privatisation. The agency aims at at-
tracting mainly foreign buyers, but subsidised credit shall be available
for potential domestic buyers. Several problems, however, remain un-
solved. Old enterprise debt (government debt and interfirm debts) still
needs to bu dealt with. The privatisation i;ch<.'ine forouuun BUUIIIU to be
A firm complies with Bulgarian privatisation rules if it has a com-
plete ownership documentation and a relatively "good" financial situ-
ation (= fixed assets exceed liabilities). Firms that have to undergo
restructuring belong to the second class, whereas firms that are to
be liquidated make up the third class [PlanEcon, Business Report, 17
February 1993, p. 8J.Biblicfhek
4es Instituts fur Welhvirtschaft
13
geared toward foreign capital; there still is no local capital market to
mobilise domestic savings on any important scale. Also, since major
firms are being .transformed into public stock companies, a stock market
in which the actual economic value of these firms can be determined is
still absent. In the end, the general investment climate as well as the
availability of attractive debt-equity swap schemes will determine the
level and pace of foreign involvement. Hitherto at least, foreign direct
investment in Bulgaria has been rather negligible.
Demonopolisation is also underway in the context of economic restructur-
ing. Large industrial conglomerates as well as large construction,
transport, tourism and trade firms were broken up into smaller inde-
pendent units. These smaller units were then transformed into joint-
stock and limited liability companies; share ownership is retained by
the- government until privatisation takes place. The same procedure is
applied in agro-industry. In some of the cases in which demonopolisation
was impossible and the affected firms could not be liquidated, the soft
budget constraint was continued. In other cases, however, state subsi-
dies, government credit and the wage bills were put under tight control.
Enterprise debt, firm asset valuation and the liquidation of unprofit-
able firms are issues still to be addressed more seriously in the cur-
rent phase of the transformation process, as well as alternative pri-
vatisation schemes and the establishment of a local capital market in
order to mobilise domestic savings [OECD 1992).
5. Outlook
Three major elements are very likely to determine Bulgaria's economic
future: (i) the speed of the transformation process and the quality of
its results, (ii) Bulgaria's international position and (Hi) the inter-
national environment. The present status of the transformation process
has already been analysed in the preceding section; here we will focus
on (ii) and (iii).
Bulgaria's international position can be established with respect to
this country's relative growth (or catching-up) potential and with re-14
spect to this country's international competitiveness in hard-currency
trade. Vis-a-rvis the United States, the technological leader of the
West, the catching-up potential of Bulgaria seems to be similar to the
one shown by other Eastern European countries and by other lower-middle-
income countries as well. As can be inferred from Table A 5, comparing
GDPs across countries with purchase power parities (base year: 1985) in-
stead of current exchange rates, in 1990 Bulgaria's per capita income
exeeded Hungary's, Poland's, Romania's, Algeria's and Argentina's. If
one is ready to follow the catching-up hypothesis, the speed with which
a country converges to the income level of the US could be higher for
the latter countries than for Bulgaria.
The international competitiveness of Bulgaria can be inferred from the
indicator of revealed comparative advantage (RCA), as shown in Table.
A 6. This indicator shows whether a country is competitive (RCA posi-
tive) or not (RCA negative) in international trade with respect to a
specific product group. According to the estimates in Table A 6, Bul-
garia has demonstrated to be competitive in her trade with OECD member
countries in raw-material-intensive products (1970, 1980, 1988), in
labour-intensive products and in capital-intensive products (both only.
in 1988). Vis-a-vis OECD member countries, Bulgaria's comparative disad-
vantage showed up in R&D-intensive products. This can be interpreted as .
meaning-that as a result of the heavy systemic distortions in the Bul-
garian economy from 1946 to 1988, following the factor proportions hypo-
thesis of international trade, the relatively (artificially) abundant,
factors determined Bulgaria's international position. Since abundance
and scarcity are economic concepts and depend on the correct valuation
of physical quantities, the transformation process can be expected to
radically change the measured abundance and scarcity of production fac-
tors by changing their value. Changes in the relative factor supplies •
are likely to result in a new international position. Bulgaria's future ,
position could be influenced by the fact that at international prices
Expressed in simple terms, the hypothesis maintains that, under cer-
tain circumstances, poorer countries can catch up faster with the
leading (richest) country than countries almost as rich as the
richest one; it has been attributed to William Baumol [1986].15
a resource-intensive structure of production might not be viable any
more. To the extent that the current international position of the newly
industrialising countries of South-East Asia (NICs) can be considered to
constitute a prediction of the future profile of comparative advantage
of Eastern European countries, it could be hypothesised that the com-
parative advantage of a transformed Eastern Europe could shift away from
resource-intensive products towards labour-intensive products and easy
to imitate R&D-intensive products (Table A 6).
The third factor potentially influencing the future role of Bulgaria in
the world economy is the expected development of the international en-
vironment. Table 5 presents a summary of forecasts for GDP growth, world
export growth, and the price of oil and capital. A slightly increasing
real interest rate could imply that Bulgaria's external debt problem
could become a serious burden if it were to remain unsolved (OECD 1992).
It could also imply that foreign direct investment is bound to be scarce
during the 1990s and that only the most attractive locations will see
capital inflows. Since direct investment is also known as the main ve-
hicle for technology transfer, Bulgaria would have to become competitive
as a location of economic activity first in order to create the neces-
sary conditions for future structural change and growth on the basis of
Western technology.
A relatively low price of oil is good news to a country as Bulgaria with
an important oil import bill and negligible own oil reserves. The same
holds with regard to the growth rates of real income in OECD member
countries of around 3 per cent. Expanding income will stimulate OECD im-
ports and thus exports from non-OECD countries. A transformed and inter-
nationally competitive Bulgaria could benefit from OECD growth by at-
tracting foreign direct investment from OECD member countries and ex-
porting labour-intensive and easy to imitate R&D-intensive products to
the OECD region.
After experiencing a contraction of real GDP of 26.4 per cent in 1991
(Table 1), the Bulgarian economy can be expected to recover only slowly
during the first half of the 1990s; higher growth rates should be un-16
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likely before 1995. The foreign exchange bottleneck, exagerated by the
consequences of the foreign debt, could keep imports on a relatively low
level until 1995. Since growth will need to be fuelled by new investment
and the latter is dependent on the country's capacity to import new
machines and equipment from the West, conservative expectations could
reasonably see growth of 2 to 3 per cent p. a. taking place towards the
second half of the 1990s. Table 6 summarises some of the available fore-
casts for the Bulgarian economy.
III. Energy Supply and Demand
1. Resource Endowment and Domestic Production of Primary Energy
Bulgaria has only very few valuable domestic energy resources. Proven
If no other source is explicitly given, data mentioned in this chap-
ter has been provided by the Committee of Energy.17


































Source: World Bank [1992a]; OECD [1992]; own estimates.
oil and gas reserves - never important - have been declining and the
country's hydropower potential is very limited; existing uranium re-
sources are of low grade. Coal, the only abundant resource, is of low
quality. Accordingly, coal accounts for 56 per cent of the domestic pro-
duction of primary energy; it is followed by nuclear power and hydro-
power (43 per cent) (Table A 16).
Lignite reserves (1990: 2350 Million t were considered to be minable at
current domestic prices and technology) are concentrated in one site,
the open-pit deposit of Maritza-East. Assuming the present production
rate were maintained, these reserves could last for about 85 years. Sub-
bituminous (210 Million t), bituminous (10 Million t) and anthracite
(1 Million t) coal reserves are not only small, but probably not eco-
nomically recoverable. Also, a recent discovery of hard coal in North-
east Bulgaria, lying at an average depth of around 2000 m, might not be
commercially recoverable. Furthermore, while lignite presents an ex-
tremely low heating value (about 2.7 times lower than anthracite) and a
high ash and sulphur content, sub-bituminous coal is characterised by a
high ash content.18
Production of all coal types declined in recent years, with the produc-
tion of anthracite falling most (Tables A 7 - A 9). Lower investment in
coal mining, complex geological structures difficult to be mastered
applying obsolete technology, problems in the provision of spare parts
and new mining equipment by the former Soviet Union, and the slowdown in
economic growth in the 1980s followed by the current deep recession are
some of the factors blamed for this development.
Though proven high-quality hydrocarbon reserves are estimated at only 13
Million barrels of low-sulphur oil and 5 Billion cubic meters of natural
gas without sulphur and sulphur compounds (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
1991), the geological prospects for finding onshore and especially off-
shore hydrocarbons are considered to be one of the best in Eastern
Europe. Large-scale onshore surveys began as early as 1947 and offshore
geophysical studies were carried out since 1960. Due to the use of ob-
solete (mainly Soviet) technology in the past and to the fact that many
parts of the country, including some areas of the continental shelf in
the Black Sea, appear to have been explored only lightly, the probabili-
ty that up-to-date technology, particularly computer-based seismic
interpretation, could reveal the existence of commercially interesting
oil and gas resources appears to be very high. Another 500 to 1500 Mil-
lion barrels of oil in reservoirs of 100 to 300 Million barrels each
could be possible (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 1991). Production of.
oil and gas has been falling for a decade as a consequence of a lack of
new reservoir discoveries (despite considerable government investment in
exploration), a deterioration of infrastructure and operational equip-
ment, and the adverse development of the Bulgarian economy in the 1980s
(Tables A 10 and A 11).
There are no reliable estimates of total Bulgarian uranium resources. It
is known, however, that the uranium produced in 6 mines and in 11 in-
situ leaching facilities is of low grade. The yellow cake (uranium con- ,
centrate) used to be exported to the Soviet Union for upgrading (and
then re-imported by Bulgaria). Cumulated uranium production (1961-1989)
reached about 9570 t metal content, i. e., 330 t metal per year on aver-
age. Production fell to 270 t in 1990 and was finally stopped 1991, be-19
cause the Soviet Union suspended its purchases. According to the World
Bank, Bulgarian yellow cake production is not profitable at current
world market prices (World Bank 1991a).
2. Domestic Production of Electricity and Oil Derivates
There are three sources of electricity in Bulgaria: domestic plants
owned and operated by the Committee of Energy (COE) (1990: about 84 per
cent of totnl nupply), domi.'ntic plants linked to industrial conglom-
craten (8 por cent) and nc;t imports from the former Soviet Union (8 per
cent). Total generating capacity owned by the COE was 10896 MW in 1990,
consisting of 5161 MW from fossil fuel (coal, heavy fuel oil, gas) fired
plants, 3760 MW from the Kozloduy nuclear plant, and 1975 MW from hydro-
power plants (Table A 14). Together with capacity from industrial com-
panies (1100 MW) and further (domestic) capacity dedicated under con-
tract to the former Soviet Union, Bulgaria's total installed capacity
for the production of electricity amounts to about 12000 MW. With the
peak level of demand having reached 8332 MW in 1989, available capacity
should normally be more than sufficient to meet domestic demand, at
least in nominal terms. For several reasons, however, available capacity
is much lower than installed capacity.
Almost 38 per cent of electricity produced in 1990 by the COE was gene-
rated at Kozloduy, 35 per cent in thermal power plants burning Bulgarian
coal, 18 per cent in plants using imported coal, 4 per cent from plants
burning heavy fuel oil and gas, and 5 per cent in hydropower plants. Two
of the six reactors (pressurised water reactors made in the Soviet
Union, using slightly enriched uranium as fuel) installed at Kozloduy
are currently being overhauled following the emergency improvement pro-
gramme implemented after the International Atomic Energy Agency raised
serious objections concerning their operational safety. The programme,
which is being coordinated, administered and financed by the Commission
of the EC, does not allow to predict yet whether two other units - in-
cluding the newest one - will ever be able to operate at full capacity.
Another issue that could keep Kozloduy from operating near its maximum
level is the still unsolved radioactive waste treatment and storage20
problem. Formerly, the Soviet Union had committed itself to take back
the used fuel volume resulting from burning upgraded uranium supplied by
Soviet sources. This practice was discontinued in 1990. Plans to expand
nuclear generation capacity by constructing a second plant at Belene
have been shelved for the time being.
Many thermal plants, presenting utilisation rates averaging only 50 per
cent (optimal rates amount to more than 80 per cent), are not only- fac-
ing operational problems (boilers needing repairs or replacement) but
also interruptions in the deliveries of both domestic and imported
fuels. As was already mentioned above, domestic coal production has been
declining for a number of years. For example, the Maritza East Complex,
which receives lignite deliveries from a captive mine, had to adjust
electricity output to coal deliveries more often than not falling short •
of the quantity required for full capacity operation. Another example is
the power plant at Varna. The utilisation rate of this plant, designed
to burn coal from the Ukraine or gas, has been fluctuating due to un-
certain coal shipments from the Ukraine.
Out of the 87 hydropower plants located in Bulgaria, making up about 15
per cent of the country's nominal capacity to generate electricity, 11
plants account for more than 75 per cent of total hydropower capacity
(Table A 15). Depending largely on the supply of water in the reservoirs
and differences in altitude occurring in the normal path of rivers, Bul-
garia's hydropower potential is limited. For Bulgaria is generally en-
dowed with small rivers, the water load of which is very often affected
by droughts, and the only important river, the Danube, has a rather
small drop in altitude. Thus, for example, in the event of a dry year
(as in 1990), a partial depletion of the water reservoirs used by the
main 11 plants can substantially diminish the available hydropower capa-
city. In view of the recent dam constructed in Czechoslovakia that in-
volved a deviation of the Danube, the water flow through Bulgarian ter-
ritory should have diminished, thereby increasing the risk of water
supply interruptions. Furthermore, given competing uses of Bulgaria's
limited water resources, the current absence of an efficient water
management policy could also lead to a reduced water availability for
hydropower purposes.21
Total Bulgarian electricity output began to rise steeply in the 1970s
after the first reactors were activated at Kozloduy. While nuclear ex-
pansion continued throughout the 1980s, the contribution of hydropower
to total output decreased, due to lower than normal precipitation in
this period. Therefore, total supply could not rise as fast in the 1980s
as it did in the 1970s; fluctuations in electricity generation by ther-
mal plants did not alter the corresponding output share very much. Total
production of electricity reached its maximum in 1988 (45036 Million
kwh) and declined by 2, 5 and 8 per cent, respectively, from 1988 to
1991; our estimate for 1992 indicates a further decrease (Table A 13),
reflecting the fact that power cuts were frequent during the Winter
1991/92.
Oil products are produced in refineries located at Burgas (Black Sea
coast). Ruse (near the Danube river) and Pleven (near the biggest proven
onshore oil field), with Burgas representing about 85 per cent of total
domestic refining capacity. The latter includes facilities for atmo-
spheric (12 Million t/year) and vacuum distillation (3.7 Million t/year)
as well as other other purposes (catalytic reforming, hydro-treating,
catalytic cracking, alkylation, visbreaking and MTBE production). Until
1991, it satisfied most of internal oil product demand. In addition, it
has been reserving an increasing share of its capacity for third-party
processing. Crude throughput at Burgas declined from some 12 Million t
in 1988 to around 6-8 Million t in 1991, due to reduced Soviet deliver-
ies, and the country's inability to diversify imports in the presence of
the foreign debt problem and the foreign exchange bottleneck. Although
third-party processing also fell in 1990 (by some 40 per cent), some
reports see a substantial expansion in this segment beginning in 1991
(Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 1991). Hard-currency fees earned in
third-party processing are expected to widen the scope for both crude
oil imports from new sources and local sales of a certain share of the
refinery output. One of the remaining two small refineries is special-
ised in lubricants (Pleven), and the other one (Ruse) has been closed
down.
While total Bulgarian refinery output began to decrease slowly in 198822
(Table A 12), the most important oil products rather showed production
fluctuations in the second half of the 1980s (Tables A 17 - A 19). How-
ever, 1990 and 1991 represented a serious turning point for both total
and individual output, with decreases of 38 and 54 per cent (total out-.
put), 34 and 51 per cent (motor and aviation gasoline), 41 and 52 per
cent (gas-diesel oil), and 38 and 58 per cent (fuel oil). In part, this
development is related to lower demand in the wake of the general con-
traction of economic activity, but mostly to the already mentioned re-
duced deliveries of crude oil.
3. Transmission of Energy
Electricity, heat, natural gas and refined oil products are generally
transported either through grids or by pipeline in Bulgaria; there is no
crude oil pipeline. Only in 1959, the first 110 kV electricity line with
a length of 1985 km came into being. By 1970 also a 220 kV line was in
use and the domestic electricity grid was in a position to carry power
to most parts of the country. Further developments in the 1970s and
1980s added a 400 kV line to the system, including the possibility to
convert 400 into 110 kV; currently there is a total number of 24 con-
verters of the 400/110 kV type. Following the installation of low and
middle voltage lines (10 - 20 kV), 279 converters of the 110/20 type
were built. In addition, in order to establish a link with the former
USSR, particularly with the Ukraine, a 750 kV line was constructed. As
can be seen from Table 7, Bulgaria's national electricity network is
quite developed.
Bulgaria's electricity grid is connected with all neighbouring coun-
tries. Through the MIR (or IPS ) system, Bulgaria is synchronised with
the former CMEA countries, notably with the Ukraine and Romania. With
ex-Yugoslavia and Greece, both a part of the West European UCPE net-
work, Bulgaria is linked on the basis of the so-called isolated island
Interconnected Power Systems.
2
Union for the Coordination of Production and Transport of Electrici-
ty. This is the world's most important grid (384 Gigawatts).23
Table 7 - The Length of Bulgaria's Electricity Lines by Voltage Levels

































Source: Committee of Energy.
principle (= partial synchronisation), due to the different standards
prevailing in the Eastern and Western grids. Also, Bulgaria is connected
with Turkey, a country not participating in either the IPS or the UCPE
grids, but flexible enough, as far as the technical standards are con-
cerned, to exchange power with countries belonging to both grid systems.
Similar to other segments of the energy market, the transmission and
distribution of electricity shows a series of operational problems as-
sociated with poor service, a low level of investment and a lack of
spare parts and new equipment. In particular, the low and middle voltage
lines are not performing to their full capacity. Official data reveal
transmission and distribution losses of the order of 10 to 12 per cent
of total electricity supply in the 1980s, a level that matches quite
well the average losses observed in less developed countries. Further-
more, since Bulgaria is a net importer of electricity, the unreliability
of supplies from the Ukraine and the problems affecting domestic elec-
tricity supply could call for a synchronisation of Bulgaria's grid with
Western Europe's.
Bulgarian natural gas imports from the ex-USSR enter the country through
a pipeline coming from Romania; it has a nominal capacity of 9-bcm/year
and mainly supplies the petrochemical complex in Stara Zagora. A second24
pipeline of similar capacity crosses Bulgaria only to supply Soviet gas-
to Greece and Turkey. An oil product pipeline (carrying diesel) links
the Burgas refinery with the storage depots in Sofia. There is no infor-
mation on the distribution of heat.
4. Foreign Trade in Primary and Final Energy
As a country poorly endowed with energy resources, Bulgaria resorts to
international trade to satisfy an important share of her demand for
primary and final energy. According to the energy balances for 1990/91,
total energy imports, expressed in standard physical units, amounted to
about twice as much as the domestic production of primary energy (Tables
A 9 and 21). Some 38 per cent of the total domestic input of coal was of
foreign origin as well as almost all crude oil and natural gas, and half
the quantity of oil products used. Net imports of electricity reached 11
per cent of total domestic electricity supply. Coal imports mainly con-
sisted of hard as opposed to brown coal, and of coke. Refined oil-pro-
duct imports referred particularly to fuel oil.
In 1991 imports of fuels, minerals and metals accounted for the single
most important share of total import value from all regions (about 59
per cent). On a regional level, former CMEA member countries and LDCs
were the main sources of fuel imports. Nearly 72 per cent crude oil came
from the former USSR, with LDCs (especially Algeria, Lybia, Iran) pro-
viding the rest; due to the UN embargo against Irak in the wake of the
last Gulf War, imports from this country - formerly a relatively im-
portant supplier - were interrupted. The former USSR provided natural
gas (100 per cent), coal (80 per cent) and oil products (38 per cent).
Electricity was mostly supplied by Russia and the Ukraine through the.
CMEA grid "MIR", with Greece, Turkey and Albania providing only small
quantities each.
The slowdown in economic growth experienced by Bulgaria after 1970 but
especially in the 1980s along with the deterioration of this country's
foreign trade and payments position had an impact on net energy imports.
As can be seen from Tables A 7 - A 13 and A 16 - A 19, imports (ex-25
pressed in physical units) decreased substantially in the period 1985-
1991. Hard coal, coke, crude oil, refined oil products, electricity im-
ports fell by 50, 81, 68, 20, 50 per cent, respectively. The foreign
supply of natural gas first increased, reached its maximum in 1990 and
then fell by 17 per cent in 1991. Imports of refined oil products, as
motor and aviation gasoline, and fuel oil, contracted by 32 and 48 per
cent, respectively, between 1985 and 1991.
One of the fundamental factors affecting Bulgaria's energy imports from
the former USSR was the collapse of the traditional CMEA clearing system
with trade valued in transfer rubles, an accounting currency unit, and
the former USSR switching to world market prices and hard currency in
January 1991 as far as energy exports were concerned. In the old system,
the USSR charged a five-year moving average of world prices expressed in
transfer rubles using an extremely overvalued exchange rate vis-a-vis
the US dollar. As long as this moving average remained below world mar-
ket prices, CMEA member countries as Bulgaria had the opportunity of
importing subsidised quantities of primary and final energy. This seems
to have been the case for crude oil until May 1983 and again during the
last Gulf War; from May 1983 to July 1990 the opposite seems to have
been true (Foders 1991). Energy imports were generally payed for with
goods in the framework of bilateral countertrade arrangements. Since
these goods were overpriced and only rarely competitive in the markets
of the West, a further subsidy was implicit in this type of exchange
that, in the long run, rather reduced the scope for a regional diversi-
fication of exports. For a long time, at least as long as CMEA energy
prices were set lower than world market prices, terms of trade appear to
have developed favourably for the energy-importing member countries of
the CMEA. Some countries, notably Bulgaria, however, were able to fur-
ther improve their terms of trade by using "cheap" crude oil imports to
produce refined products that could be sold in the West for hard cur-
rency and at world market prices. Although the distortions character-
ising the CMEA region thus paradoxically resulted in both integration
effects (trade diversion and trade creation in the energy field) and
terms-of-trade effects, potential benefits seem to have been more than
compensated by the risks implied by the development of an uncompetitive26
industrial structure and the high dependence on subsidised energy im-
ports from mainly one source. In recent years, the breakdown of the CMEA
payments system and the sharp decline of energy exports from the former
USSR to Central and Eastern Europe, due to serious disruptions of energy
production, transport and trade in the former USSR (Foders 1991), fully
revealed the major weaknesses of intra-CMEA economic relations.
5. Energy Consumption by Sources and Economic Sectors
Bulgaria is a major energy consumer. As compared to other Central and
Eastern European countries and measured by the per capita consumption of
energy, Bulgaria was fourth in the ranking in 1965, after Czechoslova-
kia, Poland and Hungary (Table 8). In 1990, Bulgaria was only second to
Czechoslovakia. Interestingly, the low-middle-income countries with a
similar per capita income as Bulgaria showed a much lower level of ener-
gy consumption in 1990, although Algeria's consumption grew much faster
than Bulgaria's and Malaysia's consumption expanded at the same rate as
Bulgaria's in the period 1965-1990. As measured by energy intensity of
GDP at current exchange rates, Bulgaria is characterised by an efficient
use of energy; as Romania's too, Bulgaria's economy requires a compara-
tively high input of total energy per unit of GDP (Table 8).
In contrast to the diversified structure of the total input of primary
and final energy into the Bulgarian economy (as shown by the energy
balances in Tables A 19 and A 21), almost half of final energy consump-
tion is concentrated in oil products (46 per cent). Natural gas, coal
and electricity account for about 16 per cent each, leaving only 6 per
cent for heat.
Most energy is being used in the manufacturing industry, where iron and
steel (16.5 per cent of industrial consumption) and chemicals (40 per
cent) account for the highest shares. Industry is followed by households
(19 per cent of total consumption); all other sectors (agriculture, con-
struction, transport, the public sector) are rather small consumers.27
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Source: World Bank [1992b]; - own calculations.
Industry is the biggest user of natural gas (99 per cent), coal (56 per
cent), electricity (47 per cent), and oil products (45 per cent), where-
as industry and households together consume the lion's share of the sup-
plied heat (about 38 per cent each). Households are also important as
electricity users; they do not use natural gas. The manufacturing of
chemicals is the most energy intensive activity, as far as oil products,
natural gas and electricity is concerned. The production of iron and28
steel is very coal intensive. Food, beverages and tobacco also need a
quite high input level of energy, particularly of oil products, elec-
tricity and heat. Finally, textiles, clothing and leather manufacturing
require more heat than any other industry.
The available data and information on the demand side of the Bulgarian
energy market do not allow a deeper analysis either by sources or by
economic sectors. From the figures representing apparent consumption of
primary and final energy resources (Tables A 7 - A 13 and A 16 - A 18)
some conclusions may be drawn regarding the evolution of this gross
measure of consumption in the period 1985 - 1991. In spite of the still
high level of energy consumption in Bulgaria, apparent consumption of
most energy sources decreased during the second half of the 1980s. While
hard coal suffered a contraction of about 50 per cent, crude oil and re-
fined oil products fell by 66 and 58 per cent, respectively. The demand
for electricity and brown coal only showed a comparatively minor de-
crease, whereas the consumption of natural gas increased somewhat. The
consumption of oil products was also reduced. These developments seem to
indicate quite well the close relationship between economic growth and
energy use. The slowdown in economic growth in the 1980s as well as the
recession experienced in recent years had a clear impact on Bulgarian
energy consumption.
6. Environmental Aspects
Bulgaria's industrialisation strategy resulted in a heavy burden for the
environment. With air, water and land resources sytematically underpric-
ed the exposure of these resources to pollutants stemming mainly from
heavy industry and the energy sector resulted in a high social cost of
economic activities under the old regime. The overall environmental pic-
ture includes features such as the contamination of drinking water
sources, air pollution in urban areas and in regions in which industrial
or mining complexes are located, and the use of valuable agricultural
land to dump waste. The legacy of the past thus points at another topic
that should rank high on the agenda of economic transformation: environ-,
mental policy.29
To what extent can the environmental status of Bulgaria be attributed to
the energy sector? Table 9 shows the main sources of sulphur dioxide
emissions related to energy use. Thermal power plants turn out to con-
stitute the single most important source, particularly those plants that
burn domestic (high sulphur, low caloric value) lignite. The use of
high-sulfur brown coal briquettes in households, generally for heating,
makes them the second source of air pollution with SO , especially in
residential zones. The intensive utilisation of coal is also associated
with emissions of carbon dioxide (Table 10), which appear to be exces-
sively high in Central and Eastern European countries, due to the domi-
nant role of coal in their energy mix. As far as Bulgaria is concerned,
there are two main sources of CO pollution, coal and oil, which is why
Bulgaria comes very close to the average fuel shares in CO emissions
for the world. Eastern Europe accounted for about 6 per cent of global
CO emissions in 1990 and is expected to slightly reduce its share to 5
per cent in 2050, according to simulations with the OECD's GREEN model
for a scenario with no substantial changes in national environmental
policies around the globe (Table 11).
Besides the energy mix, another major reason for the important contri-
bution of the energy sector to environmental pollution is the level of
energy consumption. As expected, estimates for the income elasticity of
energy demand in Eastern Europe are somewhat higher than those for the
EC member countries and the US (Table 12). They seem to be at par with
the average elasticity for the world, due to the fact that energy demand
in rapidly growing developing countries (Brazil, China, India and other
newly industrialising countries (NICs) from Southeast Asia) exceeds the
level observed in Eastern Europe. As in many NICs, the relatively high
income elasticity of energy demand in Eastern Europe reflects energy
price distortions (mainly subsidies) and their impact on the choice of
production technologies at the firm level. Interestingly, in the case of
Eastern Europe the carbon dioxide elasticity matches the energy elas-
ticity, whereas in the EC and the US the carbon elasticity turns out to
be lower and in the former USSR as well as in the less developed coun-
tries it turns out to be higher as the energy elasticity (Table 12).
This seems to underline the close relationship between CO emissions and
energy use in Central and Eastern Europe.30
































































Source: Committee of Energy; own estimates.













































Source: Burniaux et al. [1992a], Table 4.31
Table 11 - CO, Emissions in Selected Regions 1990 - 2050 (Simulation














































Source: Oliveira-Martins et al. [1992], Table 4.
Table 12 - CO Emissions and GDP Growth in Selected Regions 1990 - 2000
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Source: Burniaux et al. [1992a], Tables 3 (GDP) and 5 (CO emissions);
Burniaux et al. [1992b], Table 15 (income elasticities of energy
demand); own calculations (CO elasticities).32
One of the major SO pollutants in Bulgaria is the large Maritza East
power complex (about 700 000 tons of SO per year). Although this com-
plex is endowed with high stacks for dispersion and electrostatic pre-
cipitators to reduce to environmental consequences of sulphur emissions,
the sulphur concentration of this plant's emissions remains high. Also,
mining in this area - the power plant is linked to a coal mine - has ad-
versely affected thousands of hectares of agricultural land. Another im-
portant Bulgarian polluter is the refinery located at Burgas; it dis-
charges big amounts of largely unfiltered wastewater into the Black Sea.
Since environmental regulation including some of the severest standards
in Eastern Europe traditionally existed in Bulgaria, the status of the
environment is rather a result of the poor enforcement of such stan-
dards.
7. Strengths and Weaknesses
The main strengths presented by the supply-side of the Bulgarian energy
market can be summarised as follows:
Bulgaria uses a diversified basket of primary and final energy re-
sources:
- the nominal installed capacity to generate electricity and to refine
crude oil exceeds domestic demand;
- the geological potential for discovering onshore and especially off-
shore hydrocarbons is promising;
- Bulgaria is linked to international electricity and natural gas grids.
The supply :;ide present:; tin.
1 following weaknesses:
- Bulgaria is only poorly endowed with primary energy resources and thus
highly dependent on imports of primary energy;
- energy imports come mainly from one source, Russia, which is itself
experiencing major supply disruptions;33
- the available effective capacity to generate electricity falls short
of peak demand, due to a serious deterioration of power plant and dis-
tribution equipment;
- the only Bulgarian nuclear plant does not comply with Western safety
standards j
- a heavy environmental impact of primary energy production and trans-
portation.
The demand side of the Bulgarian energy market is characterised by the
following strengths:
- a large scope for improving energy efficiency and energy conservation
in general;
- a large potential for energy savings looming in the transformation of
the Bulgarian economy, particularly by reducing both the weight of
energy-intensive industries in the future composition of the manu-
facturing sector and energy use in all sectors of the economy.
The weaknesses of the demand side can be summarised as follows:
- a low level of energy efficiency in all sectors of the economy;
- a high share of oil products and lignite in energy consumption;
- a heavy environmental impact of oil and coal use in terms of emissions
of SO and CO ;
- the absence of taxes on energy consumption and environmental pollution
and the poor enforcement of environmental standards.
IV. Energy Policy
Energy policy traditionally played a key role in Bulgarian economic
policy. This is clearly reflected in the fact that this country opted
for the former CMEA's energy-intensive industrialisation strategy, in
spite of being poorly endowed with energy resources. The widespread dis-34
tortion of factor and product prices in the CMEA system blurred true
factor
endowments and comparative advantage. National energy policy was
thus expected to close the mounting gap between energy demand arising
from energy-intensive industrialisation on the one hand and energy
supply on the other. Energy supply consisted mainly of fuels imported
from the former USSR; imports from non-CMEA countries were severely
restricted by Bulgaria's limited access to foreign exchange. In an
attempt to hedge against the risk of supply disruptions, Bulgaria drew
heavily on locally available, low quality lignite and increasingly
turned to the nuclear option, hoping to have found the shortest road to
autarky in the energy field.
1. Organisation of the Energy Sector .'
Although Bulgaria spent most of the post-war years practicing central
planning, energy policy and its institutions were surprisingly decen-'
tralised. The energy sector consisted and still consists today of a
:
series of companies and institutions reporting to different "committees"
and ministries. As shown in Figure 1, the Committee of Energy, the Com-,
mittee of Geology and Mineral Resources, and the Ministry of Industry
are in control of most of the government-owned companies operating in
the sector. In the past, the Ministry of Foreign Relations was in charge
of the only Bulgarian energy trading company. Formally, the Council of
Ministers takes investment decisions and is also responsible for energy ;
pricing. In practice, the Council of Ministers sets prices at all levels-
but only determines the budget allocations for the energy companies.
Details that relate to the use of funds in individual companies are ge-
nerally dealt with at the committee or ministry level. Interestingly,
such executive decisions are taken with no reference at all to a consis-
tent energy programme with own policy objectives, but rather following
objectives derived from national priorities concerning industrial de-
velopment. Thus the underlying concept is that the energy sector is a
service sector of the economy, oriented at servicing industry.35

















































The inherited organisational structure of the energy sector is very
likely to change in the event of total or partial privatisation of ener-
gy companies. For the time being, however, energy companies are not be-
ing prepared for privatisation. The only measure taken to strengthen
these companies in the phase of economic transition was to create the
legal background to transform them into joint-stock or limited-liability-
companies. Also, plans to foster the participation of private (mostly
foreign) firms in some subsectors are not yet based on a comprehensive
legal-institutional framework. For example, in the upstream segment of
the oil and gas industry, in which the government is currently preparing
the next round of licensing in the Bulgarian zone of the Black Sea con-
tinental shelf, both a consistent policy and the necessary legal and ad-
ministrative infrastructure are still absent. In negotiating offshore
licences with Western consortia the government is under pressure to pro-
ceed with the pertinent rules neither publicly known nor entirely fixed.
Oil and gas projects being of a long-term nature, the participatingi
foreign companies are expected to bear the risk of future changes in oil
law, a fact that does not contribute to increase the (rather low) pro-
pensity to invest in the Bulgarian energy sector. . .
2. National Priorities for the Energy Sector
Until 1989, there were three official priorities for the energy sector:
(i) to maximise the use of domestic energy resources, (ii) to rapidly
expand the use of nuclear energy, and (iii) to stimulate energy saving.
The first priority related to encouraging the utilisation of low quality
lignite in thermal plants and in households. While the substitution of
domestic coal for energy imports made sense as a short-run reaction to a
transitory foreign exchange bottleneck, the second priority actually
deepened Bulgaria's dependency on imports. The latter is due to the fact
that Bulgaria had to import almost every input into nuclear plants and
in addition lacked facilities to handle nuclear waste; as mentioned
above, Bulgarian uranium ore is of low quality. The third official pri-
ority - energy saving - was never implemented. There was no allocation
at all of investment for energy saving purposes and the government never
created material incentives to save energy. The same applies to the pro-37
tection of the environment from the discharges of polluting substances
associated with energy production, distribution and consumption.
A non-official but in practice extremely relevant priority concerned the
improvement of foreign exchange earnings by re-exporting energy. The re-
export generally affected refinery products derived from cracking crude
oil from Soviet sources. Oil products were exported to Western countries
at world market prices. The most important non-official priority con-
cerned energy prices. The government was committed to maintain relative-
ly low prices for all users. The national policy of subsidisation of
energy consumption implied setting prices that were much lower than the
domestic cost of production, importation and distribution of energy. The
financial gap resulting from such a policy forced the electricity com-
panies to operate permanently with deficits. The latter were at first
entirely financed resorting to funds from the federal budget and later
increasingly with bank loans, resulting in an important accumulation of
internal debt by the sector (1991/2: about Leva 3.5 billion direct state
credits and Leva 3 billion bank loans). The structure of prices typical
for Bulgarian energy policy is heavily distorted in favour of households
(Table A 22). While in Western countries households generally pay higher
prices than industry, because it is cheaper to supply energy to major
consumers than to households, in Bulgaria the opposite was and still is
true.
Although after the Big Bang in February 1991 energy prices remained re-
gulated, they were allowed to increase then and several times there-
after. This notwithstanding, energy prices increased at a much slower
pace than the consumer price index, which is tantamount to say that they
actually fell in real terms. Since the Leva was not devalued according
to the difference between the domestic and the foreign rate of infla-
tion, it has been overvalued for some time. Thus, the wedge between
Bulgarian and world market prices for energy increased almost pari passu
with domestic inflation (running at 80 per cent per annum at the end of
1992).
In the area of nuclear power, Bulgaria began to receive foreign help to38
cope with problems associated with plant safety and the operation of the
existing reactors.
3. Strengths and Weaknesses
The institutional and policy framework for the Bulgarian energy sector
presents the following strengths:
- the sector is highly decentralised;
- energy companies are being transformed into joint-stock or limited-
liability companies;
- nuclear safety problems have been identified and are being taken care
of with foreign help.
The sector's weaknesses include the following aspects:
- there is no energy ministry. Responsibility for energy policy is not
centralised;
- there is no coherent energy policy;
- energy consumption is still subsidised. Prices are regulated;
- the structure of consumer prices favours households and discriminates
against industry and other major consumers;
- subsidisation of energy consumption has several consequences: (i) high
domestic energy demand, (ii) inefficient use of energy, (iii) continu-
ation of the soft budget constraint for energy companies and accumula-
tion of debt, (iii) adverse environmental impact;
- there is no comprehensive legal-institutional framework for the pro-
duction, distribution and consumption of energy;
- there is no privatisation plan for the energy sector;
- there is no policy for the participation of foreign companies in the
energy sector (exception: offshore oil and gas);
- there is no explicit link between energy and environmental policy.39
V. Energy Policy Outlook: Possible Scenarios
Almost every economic activity in Bulgaria is of the energy-intensive
kind. To the extent that the ongoing process of transformation influ-
ences some of the conditions which in the past supported the choice of
energy-using technologies, the energy sector will be forced to undergo
substantial structural changes, in order to adjust to the new fundamen-
tals prevailing at both the micro and macroeconomic levels. The close
relationship that exists between transition and energy policy implies
that an exploration of possible scenarios, each of these representing
alternative combinations of transition and energy policies, could con-
tribute to the discussion of policy options for Bulgaria. Drawing upon
the economic analysis of the Bulgarian energy market and public policy
in Chapters II to IV of this report, we shall now turn to assess several
hypothetical scenarios with the intention to shed some light on the pro-
bable development of the energy sector in Bulgaria in the 1990s.
The first scenario to be addressed here is the base case, in which vir-
tually no change takes place compared to the situation observed in
1992; it is being assumed that the current policies will be continued
until the end of the decade (Scenario A). This scenario involves a long
period of recession-cum-inflation, with the corresponding high social
cost in terms of unemployment, real income losses, and capital flight.
Under these circumstances, the transformation process could slow down,
thereby adversely affecting the recent privatisation initiative as well
as the overall level of involvement of (local and foreign) private firms
in the economy. Economic stability will not be achieved and Bulgarian
economic policies will quickly loose credibility both in the country and
abroad. Foreign debt will remain a problem. With neither a liberalisa-
tion of energy prices nor foreign direct investment in the energy sector
in sight, the crisis of the Bulgarian energy sector is likely to deepen,
even if energy demand were to significantly fall in the wake of the re-
cession. The country, traditionally dependent on primary energy imports
(crude oil, hard coal, natural gas, and enriched uranium) and the pro-
duction of indigenous lignite, will be forced to continue and possibly
further deepen its dependency on lignite and nuclear power; the general40
macroeconomic situation and especially the foreign exchange constraint
would reduce the already narrow scope for imports. To maintain oil im-
ports at past levels would mean to further increase foreign debt. It' is
difficult to predict whether the nuclear power plant at Kozloduy will be
able to operate at an acceptable level of capacity for the next decade
without substantial new investment. The risk of a major accident looms
large today; in the base case scenario no significant improvement in the
plant's safety is foreseen during the 1990s. The status of the environ-
ment will predictably deteriorate in a setting in which the traditional
reliance on high-sulphur lignite is bound to increase, while investment
in desulphurisation and similar facilities is neglected.
The role of energy policy in the base case does not differ much from the
one energy policy had during the reign of central planning: it has the
responsibility to make ends meet, that is to make demand and supply
match, a task virtually impossible to be achieved as long as fundamental
macroeconomic disequilibria are tolerated by economic policy. In such a
scenario energy policy could turn out to be irrelevant.
The second scenario (Scenario B) assumes that stabilisation succeeds and
the recession is overcome. According to the forecasts for the Bulgarian
economy presented in Table 6 a low and a high growth scenario seem plau-
sible. In the low scenario Bulgaria grows at a lower rate than in the
high scenario. The salient features of both growth paths, which differ
in the length of the time period needed to recover from recession and
reach positive rates of real GDP growth, include price stability, higher
employment, higher investment (of domestic and particularly of foreign
origin), a rather undervalued exchange rate, a satisfactory inter-'
national settlement for the foreign debt problem, export growth, etc. On
the energy side, energy demand picks up pari passu with economic activi-
ty. Some segments of the energy market are privatised and capital and
technology inflows help to improve the sector's efficiency, safety and
environmental standards.
Under the conditions prevailing in Scenario B, energy policy again be-
comes relevant. Price liberalisation would be the measure most urgently41
needed; the domestic structure of energy prices should reflect inter-
national prices (all other inputs being valued at cost or international
prices). This will make a valuation of Bulgarian products and services
at international prices viable. Once the former (artificial) comparative
advantage in energy-intensive goods and services disappears, Bulgaria's
economy will be forced to lower the energy intensity of production in
order to increase its competitiveness in the world market. A lower ener-
gy intensity would lead to a lower domestic demand for energy. A new
structure of fuel prices and a lower overall demand for energy will call
for structural change in the Bulgarian energy sector.
What are the options for Bulgarian energy policy in a growth scenario?
Options should be requested to comply with at least two criteria: (i)
the compatibility with the current structure of energy prices in Europe
(in particular in the EC member countries) and (ii) the compatibility
with Bulgaria's resource endowment. Considering these restrictions, one
option for Bulgaria could consist in increasing the share of natural gas
in the national fuel mix (Option El). Natural gas could be imported from
Russia through an already existing pipeline; new pipelines would have to
be built to distribute the gas within the country. Investment in thermal
power plants would make the shift from lignite to natural gas viable.
The remaining fuels (lignite, oil, hydro and nuclear power) would con-
tribute to a diversification of Bulgaria's energy sources. Another op-
tion would be to continue and further strengthen the reliance on im-
ported oil (Option E2). A third option could be to maximise the share of
nuclear energy in the national fuel mix (Option E3).
Finally, a fourth option would be to concentrate on conservation as the
main source of energy, letting prices and costs determine the optimal
fuel mix for Bulgaria (Option E4) . In options El to E3 taxes should be
used as policy instruments to achieve the respective aims; in contrast,
option E4 relies entirely on price liberalisation.
The use of natural gas (El) would fulfil the price criterion, in view of
the fact that world reserves of natural gas by far exceed oil reserves.
Also, about 40 per cent of total gas reserves are located in the former42
USSR, mainly in the Russian Federation, which means that transport'costs
do not have a major impact on the supply cost of gas for Bulgaria; this
also satisfies the resource availability criterion, at least in part.
Another 40 per cent of world reserves can be found in the OPEC member
countries. In case Russian supplies should become permanently unreli-
able, a pipeline to one of the nearest OPEC countries could be built.
However, apart from minor disturbances, Russian supplies to Western
Europe (for example to Germany) have not yet proved to be generally un-
reliable. Furthermore, from the point of view of environmental protec-
tion, natural gas is much "cleaner" than hard- coal, lignite and oil.
Natural gas could substitute for lignite in most power plants and, in
addition, serve residential purposes (heating, cooking).
An increase in the share of oil in Bulgaria's fuel mix (E2) would have a
series of adverse effects. First, the world reserves of crude oil are
concentrated in the OPEC countries (78 per cent). This fact increases
the probability for an increase in the real price of oil in the long
run. Thus, Bulgaria, as a net oil importer, could become vulnerable to
an uncontrollable oil bill. Second, as many Western countries have ex-
perienced, the environmental impact of an intensive use of oil is con-
siderably higher than the one of natural gas, particularly as far as
carbon dioxide is concerned, even if it is still somewhat lower than the
one of lignite or hard coal. Thus, although today oil is one of the re-
latively cheap fuels, a greater reliance on oil creates the risk of
future oil price increases, even if the transport cost of oil (from
Russia or some OPEC member country) to Bulgaria would be negligible.
A full reliance on nuclear power (E3) assumes that every stage of the
nuclear process can be operated profitably in Bulgaria. As a country
endowed with very low grade uranium, Bulgaria will have to import en-
riched uranium. Furthermore, Bulgaria will remain an importer of nuclear
technology, equipment, spare parts and repair services. Also, the re-
cycling and/or dump of nuclear waste cannot as yet be done in the coun-
try; the corresponding services will also have to be imported. Also, it
is questionable whether the existing plant at Kozloduy will have a long
life. Technically, it will be difficult (and expensive) to achieve43
Western safety standards in the old Soviet built reactors. Therefore, as
elementary analysis shows, nuclear power does not appear to constitute
either a profitable choice or an opportunity for Bulgaria to increase
her independence from foreign energy supplies.
Finally, the conservation option (E4) implies that the liberalisation of
energy prices at all levels will lead to a lower overall energy inten-
sity in the Bulgarian economy and thus to a lower level of energy de-
mand. Higher energy prices would create incentives for a substitution of
energy for capital and labour, and for energy saving. With an efficient
use of energy resources in an economic setting in which production fac-
tors as well as products and services are valued at international
prices, the lower level of energy demand will relieve the country from
the pressure to import hydrocarbons and to maximise the use of high-sul-
phur lignite and high-risk Soviet nuclear technologies. In the long run,
this option will pave the way for the country to arrive at an optimal
fuel mix, subject to the international prices of fuels and capital.
Whichever option the Bulgarian government should select, two additional
aspects should be given a leading role in the process of designing an
appropriate energy strategy: (i) the environmental impact of energy pro-
duction, distribution and consumption, and (ii) the opportunities de-
rived from the European Energy Charter, particularly in view of the re-
cent association of Bulgaria to the EC. Environmental issues currently
rank high on the policy agenda of OECD countries. One of the most impor-
tant topics discussed by these countries is the global reduction of
greenhouse gases, particularly of carbon dioxide. The alternative policy
instruments proposed to reduce global carbon emissions include the in-
troduction of a carbon tax in the OECD member countries, the introduc-
tion of an energy-cum-carbon tax only in the EC member countries, and
the implementation of a Toronto-type agreement with the participation of
many countries (including developing, Eastern European and CIS coun-
tries) .
As can be inferred from Table A 23 in the Appendix, global carbon emis-
sions can be best reduced through a collective move of the kind implied44
by the Toronto agreement. The reason for this seems to be that, due to
the drastic reduction of energy consumption and the generally low growth
rates observed in the OECD member countries, emissions are increasingly
concentrated in the developing countries and in Eastern Europe and the
CIS. Thus, the global impact of unilateral OECD or EC moves is likely to
be only marginal. Since the energy sector is a major contributor to car-
bon emissions, this underlines the global importance of designing energy
strategies in Eastern Europe, which explicitly take into account en-
vironmental aspects. At the same time, national policies (liberalisation
of prices) could significantly reinforce the total effect of concerted
action on an international level (Table A 23). According to simulations
carried out with the OECD's GREEN model, the cost of reducing carbon
emissions (in terms of real income losses) will be negligible, also for
Eastern European countries (Table A 24).
Therefore, environmental policy in Bulgaria should be closely linked to
energy policy, which means that it should focus on energy-related pollu-
tion. The state of the art in environmental economics (Cropper, Oates
1992) suggests that Pigouvian taxes could be the appropriate (albeit
second-best) policy instrument for pollution control in Bulgaria, even
if marketable permits cum legal liability were to be a first-best option
for an OECD member country. The reason is that two criteria concerning
the viability of policy instruments under the general conditions pre-
vailing in Eastern Europe point towards a tax solution: simplicity and
the level of enforcement costs. Certain taxes are easy to administer
(compared to marketable permits and legal liability) and cheaper to en-
force than marketable permits, emission standards and legal liability.
For it to be truly simple and effective, however, an environmental tax
should be designed having in mind the "polluter pays principle" on the
one hand and the list of inputs (fuels) or outputs (goods and services)
embodying or otherwise related to the pollutant focused upon (CO , SO ).
An alternative approach would be to concentrate the tax burden on energy
consumption (for example, on a BTU basis).
The European Energy Charter, signed by countries located in the geo-
graphical "Europe" (East and West, including the former USSR) and the45
G-24, has three main objectives: the expansion of trade in energy, co-
operation and coordination in the energy field, and an optimum use of
energy and environmental resources. These objectives entail a removal of
trade barriers for energy and associated equipment, the transfer of
Western technology, the promotion of energy sources with a relatively
low environmental impact, and the development of new and renewable
fuels. The benefits Bulgaria could reap from a participation in the
actions envisaged by the European Energy Charter would encompass the
accelerated access to the West-European electricity grid and to energy
know-how and modern "clean" technologies. Specific agreements negotiated
within the framework of the Charter could offer Bulgaria the additional
opportunity to closely cooperate with the West in improving the safety
of the nuclear plant at Kozloduy and modernising other power stations
and the transmission of power and heat within the country.
VI. Summary, Policy Conclusions and Recommendations
Bulgaria is a small, lower-middle-income country of Eastern Europe
undergoing economic transition from central planning to a market eco-
nomy. On both the macro and the microeconomic levels the country cur-
rently faces significant disequilibria. The energy sector is among the
sectors of the Bulgarian economy which were worst hit by these develop-
ments. Bulgaria is scarcely endowed with energy resources and tradi-
tionally resorts to foreign trade in order to satisfy a major share of
her demand for energy. As a member country of the former CMEA, the coun-
try pursued an energy-intensive strategy of industrialisation during the
period 1946 - 1989 and became highly dependent on energy import:; from
mainly one source, the former USSR. The recent collapse of the CMEA and
the rearrangement of the economic relations of the former USSR il i iirupted
Bulgarian imports of primary energy, thereby creating ueriouis shorlugus
of fuels in the country.
Bulgaria makes use of a rather diversified basket of primary and final
energy. The domestic conversion of primary into final energy is severely
hampered by operational problems arising from both the use of deficient46
and obsolete equipment and shortages of fuel. Although nominal installed
capacity for the production of electricity exceeds demand by far, power
plants are unable to maintain high utilisation rates and to meet peak
demand. In contrast to the supply side, the demand side of the energy
market is biased towards oil products, which account for almost half of
total energy consumption. Major consumers of energy are industry (parti-
cularly chemicals and iron and steel) and households. Furthermore, the
low level of energy efficiency, the fuel mix and the high level of ener-
gy consumption have an adverse impact on the environment.
The current status of the energy sector can be associated with a policy
that over a period of several decades favoured cheap energy and totally
neglected investment in safety and environmental protection. Subsidised
energy encouraged energy use and lead to the emergence of an economic
structure dominated by energy-intensive technologies. In addition, ener-
gy prices which did not reflect actual supply costs (domestic or inter-
national) contributed to the accumulation of debt by the energy compa-
nies. Since the structure of consumer prices for energy favoured house-
holds, instead of big users, the former enjoyed the major benefits from
energy policy.
Although one would have expected a highly centralised organisation of
the energy sector for systemic reasons, Bulgaria's public institutions
and companies involved in the sector are rather decentralised. There is
i'
neither an energy ministry nor any other ministry with the power to de-
sign, implement and monitor energy policy; rather, the responsibility'
for energy matters is widely scattered. This is probably the reason for
the current lack of a coherent energy policy in Bulgaria. The instru-
ments of energy policy, as regulated prices, taxes and tariffs, are not
employed to achieve energy or environmental policy goals. Also, a con-
sistent policy for the participation of foreign companies in the energy
sector is not in sight. Moreover, existing plans to privatise govern-
ment-owned companies do not yet extend to the energy sector. The same
applies to the new legal-institutional framework which does not include
laws governing production, transmission and consumption of energy.47
What conclusions can be drawn from the economic analysis of the Bul-
garian energy sector7 The first one is that energy reform cannot be
separated from the transformation process; energy reform in fact is a
central part of it, because market-oriented energy policies presuppose
the existence of an economic setting free of major micro and macro-
economic disequilibria. Energy policy instruments are generally in-
effective in a setting in which important features of central planning
(price controls) are retained or monetary and other disequilibria (in-
flation, foreign exchange restrictions, tax evasion, etc.) prevail. On
the other hand, if energy prices are not liberalised, energy companies
will have to bear operating losses which, in turn, will have to be
financed from the government budget or by issueing new debt. Thus, gra-
dual energy reform constitutes a burden for the general transformation
process.
Second, energy reform encompasses domestic as well as international as-
pects. For a net importer of energy as Bulgaria, the integration of the
domestic energy market into the international energy market makes energy
reform easier than a protected, gradual road to world market conditions;
gradualism postpones adjustment, thereby increasing its total social
cost. Openness, in contrast, creates the opportunity to earn the foreign
exchange needed to pay for import dependence in the energy field. Third,
there is a close link between energy use and environmental pollution.
This means that in designing energy policy one should take into account
the environmental impact (or social cost) of alternative energy strate-
gies. Fourth, energy reform calls for a comprehensive legal-institutio-
nal framework for the energy sector. Since energy projects are usually
long-term ventures, the stability of energy regimes over time influences
the propensity to invest in this sector. Fifth, energy transition will
not be feasible without a consistent energy policy. Specific energy
policy goals derived from a thorough analysis of the energy sector and
its interfaces with other sectors of the economy should guide the use of
policy instruments. Sixth, responsibility for the design, implementation
and monitoring of energy policy should be centralised. For a credible
implementation of consistent energy policies a minimum level of politi-
cal and administrative authority might be necessary. Seventh, for a48
country like Bulgaria, with a restricted access to the international
capital market, the participation of private firms (domestic and fo-
reign) might accelerate the reform of the energy sector. Private firms
could provide the necessary capital and technology to modernise the
energy sector. Privatisation could, thus, contribute to a reform of the
energy sector by shifting some responsibilities from the government or
government-owned firms to the private sector.
What measures should be taken in order to give Bulgaria relief from the
present energy crisis and, at the same time, pave the way for a reform
of the energy sector? In the short run, the following steps should be
taken:
- a consistent energy strategy for Bulgaria should be designed and
- the responsibility for energy policy should be centralised.
In the medium run,
- a comprehensive legal-institutional framework for the energy sector
should be created and
- as many energy companies as possible should be privatised.
An energy strategy for Bulgaria should follow a principle of prudent
financial management: "never put all your eggs in one basket". A diver-
sification of risk can be achieved by maintaining an array of fuels (at
least two or three) each of which should be imported from several sour-
ces. Diversification of fuels and foreign suppliers is the best hedge
against potential supply disruptions. In determining the cost-effective
fuel mix for Bulgaria the government should not rely on judgement; mar-
ket forces should indicate the cost-effective fuel mix. For this, energy
prices in Bulgaria should truly reflect international prices. However,
international prices could render some fuels produced in Bulgaria un-
profitable. As a net importer, Bulgaria should aim at the cheapest sour-
ces.49
Price policy could be complemented by tax policy. The simplest way to
create incentives for energy conservation and environmental protection
is by taxing energy consumption. In approaching energy taxation at the
consumption level there are four basic considerations: (i) revenue rais-
ing, (ii) equity, (iii) correction of externalities and (iv) changing
the fuel mix derived from market forces. There is also a presumption in
favour of equal fiscal treatment of the various energy products. This
ensures that distortive substitutions among competing fuels do not occur
as a consequence of discriminatory taxation.
Revenue raising considerations focus attention on the price elasticity
of demand and income elasticity of demand for energy. In this context,
motor gasoline and diesel could be singled out as deserving a high level
of taxation. In Bulgaria all the indications are that the demand for
motor gasoline is both income and price inelastic. Although the stock of
cars is still low compared to EC member countries, the number of ve-
hicles is increasing rapidly, in spite of the relatively high cost of
purchasing and maintaining a car, given the levels of income. Diesel
fuel is used extensively in public transport and agriculture. Equity
considerations are not appropriate in this case, even if it would bene-
fit lower income groups which rely on public transport, because any dif-
ferential favouring diesel over other fuels could also benefit high in-
come groups and/or create incentives for a substitution of motor gas-
oline cars for diesel fuelled cars. It is preferable to help lower in-
come groups through direct transfers than by distorting the value of a
fuel. For similar reasons all available fuels should be taxed with the
same tax rate, assuming domestic prices are in the range of internatio-
nal prices. Thus our recommendation involves a single ad valorem rate
(as a percentage of the liberalised domestic price) for electricity,
petroleum products, natural gas, coal (hard and brown) and heat. The
revenue raised will probably be substantial given that the typical elas-
ticities measured in Western countries also hold in Bulgaria.
Taxation can serve as an instrument to change the fuel mix derived from
allowing market forces to determine fuel shares. In case a political de-
cision should aim at achieving a better conservation of, say, coal than50
of other fuels, an additional excise tax on coal sales to the consumer
may be introduced. Similarly, the consumption of other fuels may be re-
stricted by designing excise taxes for them. Externalities can also be
corrected employing taxes. Pollution related to energy use can be re-
duced by restraining the consumption of polluting fuels through excise
taxes. However, it should be noted that such a tax works indirectly and
does not directly affect the polluter; thus, it does not offer incen-
tives to introduce abatement devices. Effluent fees, in contrast, do
offer such incentives but are not recommended here, because they are
generally of a complex nature and assume a certain level of sophisti-
cation of the enforcing authorities. Also, the enforcement cost of ef-
fluent charges is likely to be high. Consumption-oriented environmental
taxes could be selectively complemented with emission standards, applic-
able at least to the few major polluters (thermal plants, refineries,
chemical complexes, etc.), which should be relatively easy (and cheap)
to control. In case standards are not met, fines should be foreseen.
Such a simple tax system could suffice to handle the environmental con-
sequences of energy use in the 1990s.
Finally, in view of the association of Bulgaria to the EC, close co-
operation between Bulgaria and the EC member countries could contribute
to accelerate the reform of the Bulgarian energy sector. The association
agreement mentions energy as an area for economic cooperation in several
articles of Title VI (72, 73, 79, 80 and 81). While Article 73 refers to
the coal industry, 80 to nuclear safety and 81 to environmental protec-
tion, Article 79 describes the areas to be served by technical assist-
ance from the EC. This cooperation, which shall take place within the
framework of the European Energy Charter, will cover, among others, the
formulation and planning of energy policy, the development of (new)
energy resources, the promotion of energy saving and energy efficiency,
the modernisation of infrastructure, the improvement of natural gas and
electricity transmission, and, most importantly, the opening of the EC
energy market for natural gas and electricity for Bulgaria. With the
latter opportunity, Bulgaria could, for example, increase its electrici-
ty imports and substitute them for electricity produced burning low
grade, high ash and high sulphur domestic lignite. Moreover, cooperation51
with EC member countries could foster technology transfer and the par-
ticipation of private foreign firms in the restructuring of the Bul-
garian energy sector. However, it remains the sole responsibility of the
Bulgarian government to create the necessary local incentives for inter-
national cooperation.52
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Source: World Bank [1992 a].56
Table A 2 - Direction of Bulgaria's Foreign Trade by Region/Coun-












































































































Source: PlanEcon Report [August 1992]; - own calculations.57
Table A 3 - Commodity Structure of Bulgarian Foreign Trade by Re-






















































































































































































Source: PlanEcon Report [August 1992]; - own calculations.58
Table A 4 - External Debt Indicators 1980, 1990
Country Total debt Total debt service Interest payments
as a percentage of as a percentage of as a percentage of
Exports G N P









































































11.8 14.1 6.1 5.5"
27.1 59.4 10.4 15.1
6.3 11.7 4.0 4.0
37.3 34.1 20.8 18.4
Lower-Middle" Income
Countries
8' 105.0 197.6 31.2 54.9 17.8 30.5 8.9 11.0
a Unweighted average; the average for the lower-middle-incoroe countries includes Bulgaria. :
Source: World Bank [1992b], Table 24; - own calculations.59
Table A 5 - Catching-up Potential*
1 of Central and Eastern Europe














Measured as a country's


























capita as a percentage of
100). International com
, parability of real GDP has been achieved using purchase power
parities in 1985 prices.




The figures presented here were cor-







Source: World Bank [1992b]; - own calculations.60
Table A 6 - Revealed Comparative Mvantage of Central and Eastern European Countries in Foreign



















































































































a Calculated with OECD Foreign Trade Statistics using the following formula:
In [(xi/x)/(mi/M)],
with xi, mi: exports (imports) of product group i, and X, M: total exports
b I: SITC 0,2 (excl. 26), 3 (excl.
88); III: SITC 1, 35, 53, 55, 62
7 (excl. 75, 76, 78), 87,88;
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore,
35), 4, 56;
, 67, 68, 78;
South Korea,
II: SITC 26, 6 (excl


























68), 8 (excl. 87,
75, 76; V: SITC 57,
Source: Heitger et al. [1992], Table 21, p. 51.61
Table A 7 - Bulgaria: Production, Trade and Apparent Consumption



















































Source: Committee of Energy (Production); - PlanEcon Energy Re-
port [1992/93]; own estimates [1992].62
Table A 8 - Bulgaria: Production, Trade and Apparent Consumption

















































Source: Committee of Energy (Production); - PlanEcon Energy Re-
port [1992/93]; own estimates [1992] .63
Table A 9 - Bulgaria: Production, Trade and Apparent Consumption



















































Source: Committee of Energy (Production); - PlanEcon
port [1992/93] ; own estimates [1992] .
Energy Re-64
Table A 10 - Bulgaria: Production, Trade and Apparent Consumption

















































Source: Committee of Energy (Production); - PlanEcon Energy Re-
port [199-2/93]; own estimates [1992].65
Table A 11 - Bulgaria: Production, Trade and Apparent Consumption

















































Source: Committee of Energy (Production); - PlanEcon
port [1992/93]; own estimates [1992].
Energy Re-ee
Table A 12 - Bulgaria: Production, Trade and Apparent Consumption
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5125
3490
Source: Committee of Energy (Production); - PlanEcon Energy Re-
port [1992/93]; own estimates [1992].67
Table A 13 - Bulgaria: Production , Trade and Apparent Consump-




















































Source: Committee of Energy (Production); - PlanEcon Energy Re-
port [1992/93]; own estimates [1992].68
Table A 14 - Bulgaria: Average Annual Installed Capacity of Power
































































































Source: Committee of Energy.69




















































































Source: Committee of Energy.70
Table A 16 - Bulgaria: Production, Trade and Apparent Consumption


















































Source: Committee of Energy (Production); - PlanEcon Energy Re-
port [1992/93]; own estimates [1992] .71
Table A 17 - Bulgaria: Production, Trade and Apparent Consumption

















































Source: Committee of Energy (Production); - PlanEcon
port [1992/93]; own estimates [1992].
Energy Re-72
Table A 18 - Bulgaria: Production, Trade and Apparent Consumption

















































Source: Committee of Energy (Production); - PlanEcon
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Table A 20 - Biergy Balance 1991 (Source: Ccranittee of Biergy)
1991




5. Changes in stocks
6. Gross consumption of
primary energy







Power plants of selfproduc.
Plants for comb, gener. of





9. Consumption by energy pro-
ducing industries
10. Losses in transport and
distribution
11. Non-energy use





























































































































































































































Table A 20 - continued
1991




5. Changes in stocks
6. Gross consumption of
primary energy
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Table A 20 - continued
1991




5. Changes in stocks
6. Gross consumption of
primary energy
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Table A 21 - Energy Balance 1991 (Source: Committee of Energy)
1991




5. Changes in stocks
6. Gross consumption of
primary energy







Power plants of selfprod.
Plants for comb, gener. of
el. energy and heat
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• Other energy conversion
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8. Transfers
9. Consumption by energy pro-
ducing industries
10. Losses in transport and
' distribution
11. Non-energy use



























































































































































































































Table A 21 - continued
1991




5. Changes in stocks
6. Gross consumption of
primary energy
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6. Gross consumption of 4215886
primary energy
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Source: Cannittee of Energy.81
Table A 23 - Reducing Global Carbon Emissions with Alternative























































Source: Burniaux et al. [1992], Tables 2-9.82
Table A 24 - Costs and Benefits of Global Carbon Emission Reduc-









Real GDP changes relative to
Central and Eastern European
c Changes in the present value






























of real household income of non-OECD countries
business as usual scenario;
as in footnote c but for OECD countries;











Source: Burniaux et al. [1992], Tables 2-9.